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Regan v. Wald: Executive Authority and the
Prohibition on Tourist and Business Travel
to Cuba Through the Use of Currency
Controls
INTRODUCTION

S ince World War II, United States presidents

have frequently
regulated foreign travel by Americans. These travel bans were
usually imposed by the Department of State through the withholding of passports from particular individuals" or by stamping
passports invalid for travel to certain countries, such as China and
Cuba.' The Executive's motive in these cases was principally to
prevent individuals or groups of individuals from impairing the
President's conduct of foreign policy during crises 3 or to protect
travelers from physical harm in areas where armed hostilities were
in progress."
1. Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1982) and its predecessors, the executive branch has
promulgated regulations authorizing the State Department to deny passports to individuals
upon a finding that their travels would not be in the best interests of the United States. See,
e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 51.70(b)(4) (1985) (Secretary "may" refuse passport if the holder would be
likely to cause serious damage to national security or U.S. foreign policy); 22 C.F.R. §
51.75 (1949) (allowing denial of passports at the discretion of the Secretary) (repealed
1966); 22 C.F.R. § 51.135 (1958) (allowing passport denials in cases of Communist Party
affiliation) (repealed 1966); see also Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445, 448 (D.D.C. 1952)
(Executive Order issued pursuant to section 21 la).
Passport denials based on an applicant's political beliefs have been challenged in a series
of well-known cases. E.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Dayton v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 144 (1958); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Robeson v. Dulles, 235
F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 895 (1956); Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Boudin v. Dulles, 156 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955).
2. See, e.g., 26 Fed. Reg. 492 (1961) (area restrictions on travel to Cuba). President
Carter lifted this restriction, effective March 18, 1977. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1977, at
11, col. 1.
3. On March 8, 1975, the Secretary of State published his determination that Cuba,
North Korea, and North Vietnam were countries to which travel must be restricted because "unrestricted travel. . . would seriously impair the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs."
40 Fed. Reg. 13,011 (1975). See also 34 Fed. Reg. 5446 (1969) (travel ban to North Korea,
due to the hostility of the regime, unsettled conditions along the border, and danger of
impairing the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs).
4. E.g., 37 Fed. Reg. 6118 (1972) (travel restrictions on travel to North Vietnam be-
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In a recent decision, Regan v. Wald, the Supreme Court upheld a new travel restriction aimed at Cuba. The new restriction,
Regulation 560 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, prevents the transfer of United States currency by Americans traveling as part of our comprehensive trade embargo against that
country. The Reagan Administration and the Court have both
justified Regulation 560 as a permissible exercise of executive authority. However, the Regulation's legislative background and the
case law on travel restrictions suggest otherwise.
In 1963, the United States government imposed a comprehensive embargo on trade and financial transactions between
Cuba or Cuban nationals and all persons subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States.5 The embargo was then, and continues to
be, administered by the Treasury Department through section
515.201(b) (Regulation 201) of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACRs).6 The CACRs were promulgated by President Kennedy pursuant to his executive powers under the Trading With
cause "armed hostilities are in progress"); 34 Fed. Reg. 5446 (1969) (travel ban to North
Korea, in part due to unsettled conditions along the border); 32 Fed. Reg. 8250 (1967)
(travel restrictions to Middle Eastern countries due to "armed hostilities. . . in progress").
5. 28 Fed. Reg. 6975 (1963) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1985)). 31 C.F.R. §
515.329 (1985) defines "person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" as follows:
(a) Any person, wheresoever located, who is a citizen or resident of the
United States;
(b) Any person within the United States as defined in § 515.330;
(c) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of
any State, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
(d) Any corporation, partnership, or association, wherever organized or
doing business, that is owned or controlled by persons [specified above].
Section 515.330 in turn defines "person within the United States" as
(1) Any person, wheresoever located, who is a resident of the United
States;
(2) Any person actually within the United States;
(3) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or"of
any state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
(4) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization,
wheresoever organized, or doing business, which is owned or controlled by any
person or persons specified [above].
Id. § 515.330(a) (1985).
6. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985). Regulation 201(b) lies at the heart of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1985). According to the regulatory structure and the Treasury Department's administrative practice, all designated transactions
with Cuba are prohibited unless specifically exempted from Regulation 201. Therefore,
each of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations is a mere interpretation of Regulation 201.
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the Enemy Act (TWEA).7 Regulation 201 explicitly prohibits, except as specifically authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, all
transactions8 involving property in which Cuba or any Cuban national has "any interest of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect." 9 From the outset of the embargo, transactions relating to
Cuban travel were restricted implicitly through the categorical
prohibition embodied in Regulation 201. These restrictions were
relaxed in 1977 when the Carter Administration promulgated section 515.560 of the CACRs (Regulation 560) to license, for the
first time, all transactions incident to travel.10
In May of 1982, President Reagan ordered a curtailment of
licenses issued under Regulation 560 to prohibit once again, transactions related to tourist and business travel.11 The Administration claimed the modification of Regulation 560 was authorized
under section 5(b) of the TWEA and the general prohibition em7. 28 Fed. Reg. 6975 (1963) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985)). The Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1985), were implemented under section 5(b)
of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1982). For a more indepth discussion of section 5(b) of the Act, see infra notes 16, 104, and text accompanying
notes 104-107.
8. 31 C.F.R. § 515.309 (1985) defines "transactions involving property" as: "(a) [a]ny
payment or transfer to [Cuba] or [a Cuban national], (b) any export or withdrawal from the
United States to [Cuba], and (c) any transfer of credit, or payment of an obligation, expressed in [Cuban] currency."
9. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985). Regulation 201(b) states in relevant part:
(b) All of the following transactions are prohibited, except as specifically
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury (or any person, agency, or instrumentality designated by him) by means of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses, or otherwise, if such transactions involve property in which [Cuba] or
any national thereof, has at any time on or since [July 8, 1963] had any interest
of any nature whatsoever, direct or indirect:
(1) All dealings in, including, without limitation, transfers, withdrawals, or exportations of any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States; and
(2) All transfers outside the United States with regard to any property or property interest subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
10. 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621 (1977) (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985)).
Under the licensing scheme of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515
(1985), Regulation 560 operates to exempt certain transactions from the general prohibition
contained in Regulation 201. See id. §§ 515.201(a) (1985) (general prohibition of transactions), 515.560(a)(1), (c) (1985) (enumerated transactions authorized).
11. 47 Fed. Reg. 17,030 (1982) (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985)). As
amended, Regulation 560 now licenses only travel-related economic transactions in connection with official visits, news gathering, professional research, and visits to close relatives.
31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985).
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bodied in Regulation 201.12 As amended, the regulation now prohibits all economic transactions for tourist or business purposes
ordinarily incident to travel to and from Cuba, as well as transactions ordinarily incident to travel within Cuba, such as transportation, meals, and lodging.1" The amended regulation, therefore,
makes travel to Cuba impossible for many Americans.
Complex issues concerning the President's statutory authority
to reimpose this currency restriction cloud the legality of Regulation 560. The statute under which the CACRs had been originally
promulgated, section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy Act
(TWEA),14 had been amended by Congress in 1977 (the TWEA
reform legislation).1 5 Prior to its amendment in 1977, section 5(b)
gave the President, "[d]uring the time of war or during any other
period of national emergency declared by the President," broad
authority to "regulate . ..or prohibit, any . . .transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national
thereof has any interest."' Congress amended the statutory
scheme governing the President's exercise of emergency powers
to confine the President's broad TWEA authority to regulate
transactions and property with respect to a foreign state or national to periods of war. 17 The effect was to withdraw the President's authority to exercise TWEA powers during peacetime or
declared states of national emergency. In its place, Congress en12. See Joint Appendix at 98, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (defendant's
opposition to plaintiffis motion for temporary restraining order); Id. at 158, (sworn declaration of John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations); Id. at 178, (sworn declaration ofJames H. Michel, Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs).
13. "The general license contained in this section does not authorize transactions in
connection with tourist travel to Cuba, nor does it authorize transactions in connection
with business travel undertaken for any purposes. . . ." 31 C.F.R. § 515.560(a)(3) (1985).
14. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
15. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625 (1977).
16. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1976) (amended 1977). The Trading With the Enemy
Act confers upon the executive broad powers to
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any
acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving any property in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest.
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1)(B) (1982).
17. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625
(1977).
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acted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). 18 The IEEPA requires the President to declare a state
of national emergency and to seek concurrent Congressional approval before implementing any new economic sanctions against a
foreign country or national."x
However, Congress provided for a continuation of presidential authority under section 5(b) of the TWEA to exercise economic powers in connection with previously declared peacetime
national emergencies. Congress expressly determined that the
President should not be required to declare a new national emergency in order to continue an existing embargo; it decided that
the President should be permitted to continue under the old statutory framework the trade embargoes, such as the CACRs, that
were in effect at the time the new legislation was under consideration. Thus, a grandfather clause was included in the IEEPA preserving the section 5(b) authorities "which were being exercised
with respect to a country on July 1, 1977. ' '20
Since the reform of the TWEA, two opposing interpretations
of the grandfather clause's meaning have emerged. The executive
branch has construed the clause liberally to mean that the President has unilateral authority to promulgate, amend, or modify
specific regulations within the embargoes.2 1 On the other hand,
citizens and businessmen adversely affected by Regulation 560 interpret the clause narrowly-the clause freezes those specific regulations and restrictions which were in place on the effective date
of the legislation, but any future amendments or modifications of
the CACRs must be promulgated under the stricter procedural
18. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982)). The powers granted the President by this Act are essentially the same as those of section 5(b) of the
Trading With the Enemy Act, compare 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (1982) with 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)
(1982), but conditions and procedures for their exercise are different. Section 203 of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act provides that the President may "deal with
any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat."
50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1982).
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(a) (1982).
20. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625
(1977), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note (1982).
21. See supra note 12.
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restraints of the IEEPA.22
Constitutional issues also cloud the validity of Regulation 560.
Though Regulation 560 is a currency control on its face, it actually forbids exercise of the constitutional right to travel-a right
first recognized by the Court in 1958 in Kent v. Dulles. 3 Congress
expressly rejected presidentially imposed travel bans when it
amended the Passport Act in 197824 to remove from the President the authority to regulate travel through the withholding or
invalidation of passports for travel to certain countries. Regulation 560, however, represents a circumvention of the Passport Act
amendment and a restriction of travel to Cuba through a more
subtle, yet no less effective, regulatory scheme.
In 1984, the Supreme Court in Regan v. Wald,25 upheld the
President's unilateral authority to amend Regulation 560. The
Court manipulated the licensing scheme of the CACRs and legislative history of the grandfather clause in order to allocate power
to the President. The Court held that in a formalistic sense,
amendments to the CACRs were permissible because the regulation under which all CACRs are authorized-Regulation
201-remained in force at the time of grandfathering. The Court
reasoned that since the CACRs are ordered on a two-tier structure, consisting of a general prohibition followed by specific exceptions, President Carter's failure to repudiate the upper
tier-the general prohibition-automatically reserved the lower
tier authority for future amendments. The Court's superficial
analysis allows the form of the CACRs to rule over the substance
22. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a)(2), 1703(b), (c), 1704 (1982).
23. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). Kent involved the denial of a passport by the State Department because of plaintiffs affiliation with the American Communist Party. Justice Douglas,
writing for the Court, was the first to enunciate the constitutional status of travel.
The right to travel is a part of the "liberty" of which the citizen cannot be
deprived without due process of law under the Fifth Amendment. .

.

. Free-

dom of movement across frontiers in either direction, and inside frontiers as
well, was a part of our heritage. Travel. . . may be necessary for a livelihood.
It may be as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or
wears, or reads. Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values ....
Freedom to travel is, indeed, an important aspect of the citizen's "liberty."
Id. at 125-26.
24. See Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 963, 971 (1978)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1982)); see also infra note 138 and accompanying text.
25. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Burger and Associate Justices White, Stevens, and O'Connor joined.
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behind recent congressional legislation which has sought to limit
the executive's unilateral control over foreign affairs. In addition,
the decision provides not only an example of the minimal protection the right to travel is afforded by today's Court, but also a
representation of an impermissible judicial intrusion into this nation's foreign policy. Consequently, the Court may have reduced
the right to travel abroad to a mere political instrument to be utilized at the President's whim.
This Comment will examine the legality of the presidential
use of currency controls to prohibit travel to Cuba. Initially, this
Comment will provide a factual background on the CACRs and
Regulation 560. Next, in Part II, it will address the lower courts'
interpretation of the grandfather clause and discuss the Supreme
Court's opinion in Regan v. Wald. Part III will expose statutory
and constitutional flaws in that opinion. Finally, Part IV will conclude that the Reagan Administration's amendment of Regulation
560 is an invalid exercise of executive authority and that the Supreme Court has impermissably re-allocated power to the President at the expense of Congress and the people.
I.

BACKGROUND OF THE CUBAN ASSETS CONTROL REGULATIONS

AND REGULATION

560

The CACRs were promulgated by President Kennedy pursuant to section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917.28
Section 5(b) gave the President a broad range of powers over international trade during times of war or during a peacetime emergency.2 7 The regulations were authorized under the state of national emergency declared by President Truman in response to
the Korean War.28 This "emergency" has been renewed yearly
and remains in effect today with respect to Cuba.2 9 A major objec26. See 28 Fed. Reg. 6974 (1963) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. § 515.524 (1985)).
27. See supra note 16.
28. See Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
app. note prec. § 1 (1982).
29. The emergency was ended with the passage of the National Emergencies Act, Pub.
L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. at 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651
(1982)), which terminated "all powers and authorities" possessed by the executive branch
"as a result of ...
any declaration of national emergency in effect on the date of enactment" two years after enactment, id. § 101(a), 90 Stat. 1255 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1601(a) (1982)). However, Congress also authorized the President to extend for one-year
periods the embargoes exercised under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act,
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tive of the embargo "has been to deny Cuba convertible currency
which it could then use for purposes inimical to the interests of
the United States."30 In addition, Treasury Department officials
assert that the controls are the principal means of expressing this
country's rejection of Cuba's international conduct by increasing
the financial costs to Cuba for its alleged adventurism in this
hemisphere and elsewhere.31
The CACRs operate through a flexible regulatory scheme
consisting of a general prohibition which is relaxed and subsequently tightened by the issuance of specific licenses. The licenses
permit or prohibit certain types of transactions and are issued either to influence or to punish Cuba's international behavior. The
general prohibition, section 515.201 [Regulation 201], empowers
the Secretary of the Treasury to forbid all transactions with Cuba
''except as specifically authorized by the Secretary . . . by means
of regulations, rulings, instructions, licenses or otherwise.

'3 2

In

addition, the regulations grant to the Secretary the right to exclude particular persons or types of transactions from the operation of any license.33 Finally, any ruling, license or authorization
34
may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.
The licensing scheme is ideally designed to allow the President maximum flexibility in the management of foreign affairs.
The combination of an overall prohibition with selective licensing
enables the President to fine-tune the Cuban trade embargo to
meet the current foreign policy situation. Licensing decisions then
function as the expressions of continuing foreign policy
determinations.
50 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1982), providing the extension is in the national interest. Act of Dec. 28,
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b), (c), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625 (1977) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5 note (1982)). Presidents Carter and Reagan have determined that with respect to
Cuba the continued exercise of section 5(b) authorities is in the national interest. See 48
Fed. Reg. 40,695 (1983); 47 Fed. Reg. 39,797 (1982); 46 Fed. Reg. 45,321 (1981); 45 Fed.
Reg. 59,549 (1980); 44 Fed. Reg. 53,153 (1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 40,449 (1978).
30. See Brief for Petitioners at 2-3, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984); BUREAU OF
PUB. AFF., US. DEP'T OF STATE,

PUB. No. 7171,

INTER-AMERICAN SERIES

No. 66,

CUBA

25-36

(1961).
31. See Joint Appendix at 158-59, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of John M. Walker, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and
Operations).
32. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985).
33. Id. § 515.503 (1985).
34. Id. § 515.805 (1985).
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In the past, the regulations have been periodically amended
or adjusted to reflect the state of relations with Cuba.3 5 The general prohibition against economic transactions embodied in Regulation 201 was relaxed somewhat by the Carter Administration in
1977.36 In the interest of promoting better relations with Cuba
and greater freedom to travel abroad, travel-related expenditures
by Americans traveling to and within Cuba were exempted from
the general prohibition of Regulation 201 through general licensesA37 The general licensing provision, Regulation 560, permitted persons to pay for travel-related expenditures while they were
engaged in official government travel, visits to close relatives,
travel completely hosted by Cuba, travel related to news-gathering, professional reseach, or travel related to tourism or business. 38 But in early 1982, the Reagan Administration became
alarmed over two developments: Cuba's increased support of insurgents in Central America 9 and a recently initiated program by
that country to increase its foreign exchange earnings by expansion of its tourist industry with the United States.40 In response to
these two developments, the Reagan Administration amended
Regulation 560 to prohibit tourist and business-related transactions. The "adjustment" of the regulation was intended to frustrate Cuba's plans to expand its tourist trade with the United
States"*and to prevent Cuba from earning "hard currency from
35. E.g., 45 Fed. Reg. 32,671 (1980) (prohibiting transactions in Cuba relating to
transportation of Cuban nationals during the Mariel boatlift) (codified at 31 C.F.R. §
515.415 (1985)); 44 Fed. Reg. 11,771 (1979) (prohibiting transfer of blocked property to
state agencies under state laws as "abandoned property") (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.554
(1985)); 44 Fed. Reg. 11,770 (1979) (requiring that certain blocked assets be held in interest-bearing accounts) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.205 (1985)).
36. See 42 Fed. Reg. 16,621 (1977).
37. Id.
38. 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977) (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985)).
39. See Joint Appendix at 173, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs); see also
BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CURRENT POLICY No. 376, CUBAN SUPPORT FOR
TERRORISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

(1982); CURRENT POLICY No. 352,
(1981).

STRATEGIC SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARRIBEAN

40. See Joint Appendix at 173, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs).
41. Following the relaxation of travel restrictions in 1977, Cuba began to develop
plans to build 22 new hotels with 2,800 rooms and to recover or improve an additional
6,900 rooms. Joint Appendix at 173, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (1981-85 fiveyear plan) (sworn declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for InterAmerican Affairs). Legislation Decree 50 authorized joint ventures with capitalist investors,
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American tourists at a time when Cuba is actively sponsoring
armed violence against our friends and allies." 4
The amended regulation does not directly forbid tourist or
business travel to Cuba. Rather, the regulation simply prohibits
the means necessary for travel. The amended regulation forbids,
under criminal penalty,4 3 the conversion or transfer of United
States currency for the ultimate purpose of purchasing or consuning any item or service related to travel such as transportation,
meals, or lodging by Americans who go to Cuba for tourist or
business reasons. Ostensibly, the amended regulation is intended
only as a measure to exacerbate Cuba's shortage of convertible
currency."4 Indeed, tourist and business travel is permitted, provided no economic benefit is derived by the Cuban government (a
fully hosted trip, for example). But the result, intended or not, is
announced a campaign to attract hard-currency investments in tourist-related infrastructure, and sought to promote more tourism with the United States. Id.
According to the State Department, the tourist industry in Cuba was undergoing major
expansion in 1981 and early 1982. Unless Cuba's plans were thwarted, this expansion
would "provide Cuba with a growing and important revenue flow which could in a relatively short period of time . . . become the second most important source of convertible
currency for Cuba." Id. at 173.
While only 20% of Cuba's foreign exchange earnings is in hard currencies, the State
Department stresses that its importance "is far in excess of [its] nominal value" because
Cuba uses hard currency to buy critically needed machinery and transport equipment. Id.
at 175.
42. N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at Al, col. 4, col. 5. Assistant Treasury Secretary John
M. Walker, Jr. defended the amendment of Regulation 560 as an "important part of [the]
Government's policy of tightening the current trade and financial embargo against Cuba"
which was "designed to reduce Cuba's hard currency earnings from travel." Id. at Al, col.
4. "Cuba, with Soviet economic and military support, is increasing its support for armed
violence in this hemisphere . . . . In the face of Cuba's increasing attacks on freedom,
self-determination and democracy, our economic embargo is being tightened." Id. at A9,
col. 1.
43. 31 C.F.R. § 515.701 (1985), the enforcement provision, draws from section 5(b) of
the Trading With the Enemy Act the following criminal sanctions for violations of the
Cuban Assets Control Regulations:
Whoever willfully violates any of the provisions of this subdivision or of
any license, order, rule or regulation issued thereunder, shall, upon conviction,
be fined not more than $50,000 or, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for
not more than ten years, or both; and any officer, director, or agent of any
corporation who knowingly participates in such violation may be punished by a
like fine, imprisonment, or both.
Cf 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982).
44. See Joint Appendix at 173, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs); see also
N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1982, at A9, col. 1.
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that the threat of investigation or criminal prosecution for spending money inhibits tourist and business travel.4 5
II.

JUDICIAL REACTION

Since the reform of the TWEA, courts have differed over the
degree of executive authority preserved by the grandfather
clause. The majority view, as represented by the recent Supreme
Court opinion in Regan v. Wald,4 broadly construes the clause. In
Wald, the Court held that the clause permits not only future adjustments to existing restrictions but also the unilateral revocation
of general licenses as well.47 The minority view, represented by
the major dissent in Wald,4 8 and unanimous courts in the first49
and eleventh 50 circuits, take the position that the coverage of the
clause is entirely retrospective. Under their analyses, existing regulations and specific prohibitions within those regulations are frozen at the time of grandfathering. Accordingly, the IEEPA is the
proper statutory authority for any future amendments to the
CACRs.
Section A will first examine the initial judicial reaction to the
two post-grandfather amendments to the CACRs51 at the circuit
45. The Treasury Department depends heavily upon voluntary compliance with its
published regulations. It believes, however, that voluntary compliance is enhanced by a
perception that criminal punishment may follow violations of the law. Joint Appendix at
185, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of John M. Walker, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Enforcement and Operations).
The government has yet to institute criminal proceedings against individuals. Rather,
the Treasury Department has relied upon a variety of administrative penalties, such as
rescinding a company's license, i.e., barring a travel agency from doing business involving
Cuba.
The Treasury enforces its regulations by checking the travel records of tourist agencies
to see if the reasons for travel given fall within the exceptions to the general prohibition on
travel to Cuba. In 1982, for example, the Treasury investigated a Texas agency running
tours for "professional research." The Department found that the trips were primarily for
bass fishing and revoked the Texas firm's license to handle business involving Cuba. N.Y.
Times, Aug. 30, 1984, at A3, col. 1.
46. 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
47. Id. at 3035.
48. Id. at 3040-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
50. United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (l1th Cir. 1983).
51. Besides President Reagan's 1982 amendment to Regulation 560, 47 Fed. Reg.
32,060 (1982) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985)), President Carter had promulgated
31 C.F.R. § 515.415 (1985) in 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 32,671 (1980), under the authority
reserved by the grandfather clause. For a discussion of Regulation 415, see infra note 62
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court level. Then the current law will be reviewed in the area of
executive emergency power as established by the recent Supreme
Court decision in Regan v. Wald.
A. Initial Interpretationsof the Grandfather Clause
The opportunity for judicial interpretation of the grandfather clause first presented itself in Wald v. Regan.5 2 In Wald, the
plaintiffs wanted to travel to Cuba as tourists. Because the recently
amended Regulation 560 now blocked this type of travel, they
sought an injunction in United States District Court 53 against enforcement of Regulation 560. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and they appealed to the
first circuit. On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the restriction
was in excess of the authority granted under the grandfather
clause of the IEEPA. They alleged that because travel restrictions
were not being exercised on the date of grandfathering, the authority to restrict them at a later time was not preserved by the
clause." Therefore, the Reagan Administration's amendment of
Regulation 560 was invalidly promulgated under the TWEA as
amended and instead, should have been promulgated under the
IEEPA.
The government disagreed. It contended "that the words 'authorities

. . .

being exercised' in the savings clause were meant to

have a very broad meaning. In the government's view, as long as
some TWEA authority was being exercised with respect to a country, say Cuba, on July 1, 1977, the clause saves the power to exercise every TWEA authority or at least every authority of the same
broad type (e.g., exchange control authority).

' 15

The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit unanimously reversed the district court's decision, holding that the amendment
to Regulation 560 was invalid because it lacked congressional auand text accompanying notes 61-67.
52. 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984). It should be noted that
the circuit courts in Wald and United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (1lth Cir. 1983),
invalidated Regulation 560 on statutory grounds alone. Neither court addressed the issue
of a constitutional right to travel abroad.
53. Wald v. Regan, No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. June 17, 1982), rev'd, 708 F.2d 794 (1st
Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
54. Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
55. Wald, 708 F.2d at 796.
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thorization. According to the court, the grandfather clause of the
TWEA did not apply to preserve powers which were not being
exercised at the time the clause became effective.
In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals cited the plain
language of the clause, its legislative history, and the underlying
purpose of the clause as the chief reasons for rejecting the government's argument.
First, as a matter of "common sense and common English,"
the court stated, "restricting, say, commodity purchases and restricting travel purchases would seem to be very different 'exercises' of authority-different enough at least not to count as the
exercise of the same authority.

'5 6

Thus, since the Executive was

restricting trade but not travel to Cuba on July 1, 1977, its authority to later regulate travel was not grandfathered. Second, the
legislative history indicated that Congress intended the savings
clause to be narrowly interpreted, allowing the President to continue in effect only those specific restrictions actually in place on
July 1, 1977, the date of grandfathering. 57 In particular, the court
noted the striking of language from the grandfather clause that
would have allowed promulgation of new regulations or programs
as persuasive evidence that Congress "did not want the existence
of one sort of TWEA restriction in 1977 to serve as a justification
for imposing a new one" in the future.58
Finally, the court of appeals believed that the savings clause
was intended to preserve existing restrictions as bargaining chips
in ongoing negotiations with the affected countries and to avoid
the adverse diplomatic consequences that might result if the President was required to declare a new national emergency to continue the embargoes.59 Thus the court concluded, permitting the
President to augment his bargaining powers by adding new retsrictions to the CACRs would go beyond the purposes of
grandfathering. 60

The First Circuit's reasoning in Wald was followed two
months later by an Eleventh Circuit decision which invalidated another CACR promulgated after the TWEA reform act. In United
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 798.
Id.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 800.
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States v. Frade,1 the appellants had been convicted under section
515.415 (Regulation 415) of the CACRs6 2 for financial transactions made in Cuba during the Mariel Boatlift. The appellants
were Cuban-American clergymen who had arranged for a boat to
bring their parishioners' relatives from Cuba. They flew ahead to
Havana in order to negotiate the release of the relatives with Cuban authorities. When they later returned by boat to Key West
with the refugees, they were immediately arrested and eventually
indicted for violating section 5(b) of the TWEA and Regulation
415 of the CACRs. At trial, appellants were convicted for their
financial expenditures: port fees and the hotel, motel and restaurant bills incurred during their intense two-week negotiations with
Cuban authorities.6 3
The court unanimously reversed the district court, finding as
had the Wald court, that the President lacked the statutory authority to promulgate a new regulation under the grandfather
clause. The government reiterated the argument it had advanced
earlier in Wald: the new regulation fell within the category of authorities being exercised on July 1, 1977. On that date, executive
authority under the TWEA regarding Cuba was being exercised
through the CACRs. 6 It contended that either Regulation 415
was a mere explanatory modification of the general prohibition of
Regulation 201, or alternatively, that the existence of some regulations regarding Cuba under the TWEA as of July 1, 1977 was
sufficient ground to invoke the grandfather clause as statutory authority for the promulgation of future regulations regarding
61. 709 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1983).
62. 31 C.F.R. § 515.415 (1985) prohibits transactions in connection with the transportation of Cuban nationals unless a license to do so is granted. Section 515.415 prohibits
(6) The transfer of funds or other property to any person where such
transfer involves the provision of services to a Cuban national or the transportation or importation of, or any transaction involving, property in which Cuba or
any Cuban national has any interest, including baggage or other such property;
(7) Any other transaction such as payment of port fees and charges in
Cuba and payment for fuel, meals, lodging; and
(8) The receipt or acceptance of any gratuity, grant, or support in the
form of meals, lodging, fuel, payments of travel or maintenance expenses, or
otherwise, in connection with travel to or from Cuba or maintenance within
Cuba.

Id. § 515.415 (a)(6)-(8).
63. See Frade, 709 F.2d at 1391-92.
64. Id. at 1397.
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Cuba. 5
The court conceded that the terms "authorities" and "exercise" could appear to be "elastic enough to encompass the government's interpretation." '6 I But it echoed the First Circuit's Wald
opinion stating that a "narrow restrictive interpretation is compelled by the legislative history and purpose of the grandfather
67
clause and by its function within the broader statutory scheme.
B.

Regan v. Wald

The Supreme Court ultimately found the statutory analysis of
the circuit courts unconvincing. On the government's appeal in
Wald, the Supreme Court held, by a 5-4 vote, that the language of
the grandfather clause, read in conjunction with the broad authority conferred by section 5(b) of the TWEA, supported the
government's interpretation that the authority to regulate all
property transactions, including travel-related purchases, was being "exercised" on July 1, 1977 and was, therefore, preserved."8
The Court reasoned, in addition, that neither the legislative history nor the apparent purpose of the 1977 TWEA reform act,
supported the opposite view that Congress actually intended to
freeze existing restrictions so that any adjustment of pending embargoes would require the declaration of a new national emergency under the IEEPA.6 9 Finally, the Court rested its refusal to
invalidate Regulation 560 under the guise of "classical deference
to the political branches in matters of foreign policy."'
The Court opined that "Section 5(b) draws no distinction between the President's authority over travel-related transactions
and his authority over other property transactions . . . the authority to regulate travel related transactions is merely a part of
the President's general authority [under the TWEA] to regulate
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1397-98. The court found additional support by asserting that the financial

impact of Regulation 415 was so trivial that it was insufficient to constitute an exercise of
authority like the regulations saved by the grandfather clause. Id. at 1402. The court also
noted that even if the regulation qualified as an international economic measure, it was also
an immigration control device-an act which necessarily invokes congressional approval.
Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (congressional power over naturalization).
68. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3033 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 3038-39.
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property transactions."' In addition, the Court noted that the
umbrella prohibition under which the CACRs are administered,
Regulation 201(b), automatically reserved executive authority to
modify specific regulations after grandfathering. Regulation
201(b) remained in force on the date of grandfathering. At the
same time, travel-related transactions were exempted by general
license from the categorical prohibition of Regulation 201(b) by
President Carter. The Court concluded that this exemption was
an exercise of authority. The Court reached this labored result by
reasoning that since President Carter had "regulated" travel
under Regulation 560 by permitting Americans to go to Cuba, and
because all transactions were still potentially subject to prohibition
by Regulation 201, the authority subsequently to modify the license was grandfathered 2
The Court also rejected the notion that the term "authorities" in the savings clause meant "restrictions" or "prohibitions"
as construed by the lower courts. The Court cited three determining factors in reaching its conclusion. First, if Congress had
wished to freeze existing restrictions, it could have done so explicitly. The fact that it did not compelled the conclusion "that Congress intended the President to retain some flexibility to adjust
existing embargoes.''78 Second, the legislative history could not
overcome the "clear statutory language" of the grandfather
clause.7 4 Finally, the Court found that the clause was designed to
avoid not only the adverse political consequences that would follow a termination of the section 5(b) embargoes, but also the controversy that would have resulted if the President's authority to
modify existing licenses was left unprotected.75
Addressing plaintiff-respondent's constitutional claims, the
Court admitted that Kent v. Dulles 8 recognized the right to travel
under the fifth amendment and required that "all delegated powers that curtail or dilute" that right must be narrowly construed. 77
But the Court distinguished Kent arguing that it applied only in
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 3034 (emphasis added & footnote omitted).
Id. at 3034-35.
Id. at 3035.
Id. at 3036.
Id. at 3037.
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
Id. at 129.
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cases where passports were selectively denied because of the applicant's political beliefs.7 The majority instead relied on Zemel v.
Rusk,7 in which the Court had upheld a comprehensive travel ban
to Cuba in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Court
saw "no reason to differentiate between" the currency restriction
in Regulation 560 and the passport restrictions upheld in Zemel.
The Court maintained that the currency restriction, like the restriction in Zemel, was justified by the weighty considerations of
foreign policy which are "largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference."8 0 The Court characterized its position as just another example of the "traditional deference to executive judgment in [the] vast external realm" of foreign affairs."'
A vigorous dissent written by Justice Blackmun"2 hewed to
the approach taken by the lower courts in Wald and Frade. The
dissent stressed the significance of three factors which compelled a
narrow reading of the clause: (1) the general legislative purpose of
the TWEA reform act was to provide for greater congressional
control over executive emergency powers;8 3 (2) the grandfathering was intended only to avoid exacerbation of the international
climate between the United States and affected countries and to
win executive support for the bill;4 (3) this limited interpretation
of the goals and purposes of the clause is supported by congressional committee discussions and the clause's redrafting during its
85
markup.
III.

ANALYSIS

The deficiencies in the majority opinion are manifold. Valid
arguments can be made that the amendment of Regulation 560 is
contrary to the purposes of the TWEA and also that the term
"authorities" in the grandfather clause is actually undefined and
78.

Wald, 104 S. Ct. at 3038.

79. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
80. 104 S. Ct. at 3039 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952)).
81. Id. at 3039 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304,
319 (1936)).
82. Id. at 3040-49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Powell. Justice Powell wrote a brief dissent as well. Id. at 3049
(Powell, J., dissenting).
83. 104 S. Ct. at 3040-43.
84. Id. at 3043-47.
85. Id. at 3043-44.
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ambiguous. Further, the majority opinion ignores the remedial
purposes of the TWEA reform act, misreads the congressional intent and purpose behind grandfathering and violates the spirit of
the other statutes passed in the 1970's. The Court's analysis is also
constitutionally defective. The majority incorrectly analogized
previous travel restriction cases to Wald and failed to follow established principles of statutory construction concerning laws which
have an impact upon constitutionally protected rights.
Futhermore, the Court failed to discern the difference between
judicial deference to the President in the sphere of international
relations and judicial deference to executive promulgations that
inhibit the exercise of the right to travel. This section will consider each of these assertions.
A.

The Court's Statutory Analysis

1. Regulation 560 and the TWEA. The first flaw in the Court's
reasoning is its failure to accept the regulation's inconsistency
with the purposes of the TWEA and its misunderstanding of the
term "interest" as it is used within the CACRs. The Court sustained Regulation 560, in part by claiming that its prohibitions
conformed with the broad purposes and the sweeping statutory
language of the TWEA. The majority observed that the President
is authorized to regulate any transactions involving "property" in
which a foreign country or national thereof has any "interest." 8
It concluded that travel expenses fell "naturally within the statutory language" because "payments for meals, lodging and transportation in Cuba are all transactions with respect to property in
which Cuba or Cubans [would] have an interest. ' 87 The Court
twists the statutory language, however, in order to extend the
reach of the TWEA to transactions that may take place in other
countries. The TWEA is concerned with intranationaltransactions
of property owned by foreign countries or nationals. The intention of the TWEA was to make it impossible for money or property belonging to an enemy and held in this country to reach the
hands of that enemy."8 Hence, it seems that the TWEA was intended solely to keep foreign-owned assets within the country.
86. Id. at 3044 n.16.
87.
88.

Id.
See 55 CONG. REG. 4858-59 (remarks of Rep. Snook).
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Similarly, the term "interest" is also misused by the Court. "Interest" connotes not an ownership of property located in Cuba and
owned by Cuba or Cubans, 9 but Cuban ownership or partial ownership of assets located within the United States.90 Finally, the
TWEA was never intended to control the flow of assets owned
solely by Americans. Both the 1917 and the 1941 Congresses
clearly expressed their intentions to restrict application of the
TWEA to foreign nationals and to avoid any adverse impacts on
Americans' interests.9 1 Regulation 560, therefore, exceeds the
TWEA's restrictive powers in at least two ways: tourists and businessmen travelling to Cuba presumably spend personally owned
funds in which no Cuban has any right to title or ownership and
Americans are neither foreign nationals nor enemies.
Moreover, the Reagan Administration has characterized the
amendment of Regulation 560 as an essential element of our
trade embargo of Cuba. Yet this justification is called into question by the regulation's de minimis impact on Cuba's hard currency
earnings. In order to conform with the purposes of the TWEA,
the restriction should logically relate to an emergency situation.
The facts suggest that this criterion is not fulfilled in the case of
Regulation 560. The stated policy objective of Regulation 560, as
amended, is contradicted by the substantial amount of trade and
transfers that the Treasury Department still permits. When the
amendment became effective in May of 1982, the Treasury Department indicated that the change would cut travel by forty percent from its level of 38,000 persons per year.9 2 The Department's figures show that the total yearly amount to be affected by
the amendment would be only eight million dollars.9 3 Meanwhile,
the majority of travelers to Cuba (government officials, journalists,
sports and artistic travelers and researchers) are still authorized
under the regulation to spend money." The Department's own
89.
90.

See 104 S. Ct. at 3034 & n.16.
See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1985); see also Tagle v. Regan, 643 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.

1981).
91. See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480, 487 (1947); Tagle, 643
F.2d at 1066.
92. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury News: U.S. Restricts Transactions Relating
to Travel to Cuba (Apr. 19, 1982), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 26, Regan v. Wald, 104
S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
93. See Brief for Respondents at 56, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
94. See supra note 11; see also supra text accompanying notes 41 & 45.

614

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

statistics actually show a net increase in travel to Cuba, and therefore Cuba's hard currency earnings from American travelers,
since the date the new regulation came into effect.95 The Reagan
Administration's only accomplishment has been to reduce Cuba's
tourist and business travel earnings as a component of the
increase.
In contrast with its travel restrictions, the Treasury Department authorizes overseas subsidiaries of American companies to
buy and sell Cuban goods and commodities. In 1982, American
subsidiary trade with Cuba totaled $250 million.96 It would appear, therefore, that the policy under which the amendment to
Regulation 560 was promulgated, that of denying hard currency
to Cuba, is being seriously undermined by the Department's own
authorizations of other transactions. According to the Treasury
Department, however, the subsidiary trade is justifiable because:
"[i]n 1980 and 1981, Cuba incurred substantial trade deficits with
U.S. subsidiaries in foreign countries . . . . This two-way trade
. . .imposes net costs on Cuba in terms of expenditures of its foreign exchange reserves, and unlike tourism, it does not generate
excess hard currency earnings that can be diverted for purposes
inimical to U.S. interests. '97 This statement assumes that a thriving tourist industry would give Cuba enough hard currency to
meet its foreign trade losses and still retain a surplus that it could
use to promote terrorism and military adventurism. The Administration presents no facts in support of its conclusion. There is no
data available to suggest that Cuba, having once obtained a viable
tourist industry with respect to America, would experience a net
gain, or even a balance of trade, with its Western trade partners.
Finally, any shortfall in Cuba's hard currency earnings that is
caused by the amended regulation can be replaced easily through
expanded tourism with other countries that possess convertible
currencies. Despite the Reagan Administration's efforts, Cuba's
tourist industry has shown sustained growth in the years since the
new regulation went into effect. Between 1983 and 1984, for ex95. See Joint Appendix at 176, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs).
96. See Joint Appendix at 19, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Harold A. Mayerson, counsel for respondent).
97. See Joint Appendix at 126, Regan v. Wald, 104 S.Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration of Dennis M. O'Connell, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control).
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ample, visits to Cuba by tourists from market-economy countries
grew by twenty-seven percent-from 130,325 visits in 1983, to
166,420 in 1984. Correspondingly, the hard currency earnings
from these visits increased by thirty percent. The latest figures
from 1984 show that Cuba earned a total of sixty-six million pesos
(approximately equal to $80 million) in hard currency from tourism."8 Foreign aid for the purpose of developing Cuba's tourist
industry is pouring in as well. In addition to the earnings from
increased visits, the governments of Spain and West Germany
have committed to invest $200 million between them in a Cuban
resort complex at Varadero.9 9
The efficacy of any embargo is conditioned upon a coherent
and consistent set of controls against a particular country. In the
case of the Cuban embargo, Regulation 560's impact on Cuba's
hard currency earnings has been negligible because of the substantial amount of trade that is still authorized under current
State Department policies and because of Cuba's trade with Europe. Nevertheless, the Administration has charactized the
amendment as crucial to American foreign policy interests."' Despite this characterization, the rationale behind the amendment is
trivialized by contradictions in our own trade policies with Cuba.
Regulation 560 may be clothed as an important national emergency measure, but realities suggest that such a claim is frivolous.
2. The Need for Reform. The Court's expansive reading of the
grandfather clause ignores the remedial purposes of the TWEA
reform legislation. The legislative history of the act clearly indicates a Congressional intent to curtail the discretionary authority
that the President had accumulated over foreign affairs because of
past emergencies which no longer existed. 0 1 Prior to its 1977
98. The Cuban government has launched an aggressive promotional campaign to develop its tourist industry. The campaign includes publicity campaigns in various countries,
and the opening of tourist offices in Canada, Mexico, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. Plans call for the opening of offices in the United Kingdom, Spain and the
Scandinavian countries as well. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNrr, QUARTERLY ECONOMIC
REVIEW OF CUBA, DOMINIcAN REPUBLIc, HAITI, PUERTO RIco 22 (1985).
99. News Brief.$200 Millionfor Varadero, CUBATIMES, Sept.-Oct. 1984, at 7.
100. See joint Appendix at 175-77, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn
declaration of Thomas 0. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs);
see also Joint Appendix at 107, Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984) (sworn declaration
of Myles R.R. Frechette, Director of Office of Cuban Affairs).
101. See Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3040-43 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1977) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; S.
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amendment, the TWEA gave the President the authority to prohibit or license trade with certain countries and their nationals
and the authority to seize and control foreign assets in this country in times of war or declared emergency.1 0 2 Congress provided
the power to restrict trade as a means of curtailing direct and indirect aid to enemy countries. The ability to freeze and control
foreign owned assets also provided the president with the means
to protect and safeguard foreign assets of enemies and their allies
from being "looted" by American creditors.10 3 However,
"through a continuing interplay of executive assertiveness and
congressional acquiesence, section 5(b) of the TWEA had become
a source of unlimited statutory authority allowing the President to
exercise, at his discretion, broad powers in both the domestic and
international arena without Congressional review. "104 Moreover,
REP. No. 466, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2-3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4540, 4541-42; see also Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions:
HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on InternationalEconomic Policy and Trade of the Ilouse Committee on International Relations and Markup of Trading With the Enemy Reform Legislation,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-20 (1977) (remarks of Professor Lowenfeld) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings]; id. at 20-32 (remarks of Professor Maier); id. at 32-44 (remarks of Professor
Metzger); id. at 110 (referring to the incongruity of the Korean War emergency of 1950
and the Cuban Embargo) (remarks of Rep. Bingham).
102. See supra note 16.
103. See 86 CONG. RE, 5008 (1940) (remarks of Sen. Wagner); see also Orvis v.
Brownwell, 345 U.S. 183, 187 (1953).
104. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 22, 29-30. The Trading With the Enemy Act was
enacted in 1917, six months after the United States entered World War I. Ch. 106, 40
Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1982)). As originally enacted, the Act was intended to grant only a war power, its scope limited to transactions with foreign nationals in this country, and with foreign countries. No power over
purely domestic matters was intended to be conferred. Hearings, supra note 101, at 22.
However, through a continuing interplay of executive assertiveness and congressional
passivity, section 5(b) of the Act has evolved into a statute that has all but ceded legislative
authority to the President. Id. In the sixty years following its enactment, Presidents have
used section 5(b) of the Act to "legislate" in a myriad of domestic and international policy
areas. President Franklin Roosevelt, for example, used the Act to close the banks in 1933,
see Hearings, supra note 101, at 29, and received retroactive approval from Congress in the
form of the Bank Conservation Act, Act of Mar. 9, 1933, ch. 1, §§ 201-211, 48 Stat. 1, 2-5
(1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-211 (1982)), in which Congress amended
section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act by inserting a clause permitting executive
exercise of special powers during declared national emergencies. Id. § 2, 48 Stat. at 1; see
also Hearings, supra note 101, at 29. This amendment provided a congressional grant of
power that would later serve as the springboard for expansion of section 5(b) authority. See
also generally United States v. Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d 560 (C.C.P.A. 1975).
Section 5(b) came into its widest use with World War II. In 1940 and 1941, President
Roosevelt issued a series of Executive Orders freezing first the assets of occupied countries,
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the World War II and Korean War emergencies were never officially terminated, making section 5(b) authority continually available for use. Consequently, these powers were available for exercise in situations which bore little, if any, relationship to a national
emergency.
Congress decided that there was a need for remedial legislation to correct past abuses of section 5(b) authority and to regain
some control over American foreign economic policy. During the
1977 hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, distinguished legal scholars elaborated
on the need for reform of the TWEA:
[T]here seems to be no way under existing law to terminate a state of
emergency proclaimed by the President except by another Presidential proclamation ....

The Trading With the Enemy Act itself, and particulaly sec-

tion 5(b), is legislation without limit of time. It has been in effect in its pre-

sent form since 1941 and has no expiration date or requirement for
congressional scrutiny or review. Second, the delegated authority is not only
broad, there are no criteria at all. Subject only to the existence of a national
emergency, the power of the President, acting "through any agency he may
designate" to affect property or transactions is virtually unlimited. 0 5

Another scholar noted that successive presidents had seized upon

the open-endedness of section 5(b) to turn that section, through
and later those of Germany, Japan, and Italy. See Exec. Order No. 8389, 3 C.F.R. 645
(comp. 1938-1943) (freezing assets of Norway and Denmark); Exec. Order No. 8405, 3
C.F.R. 656 (comp. 1938-1943) (The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg); Exec. Order
No. 8446, 3 C.F.R. 674 (comp. 1938-1943) (France, including Monaco); Exec. Order No.
8484, 3 C.F.R. 687 (comp. 1938-1943) (Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania); Exec. Order No. 8565,
3 C.F.R. 795 (comp. 1938-1943) (Rumania); Exec. Order No. 8701, 3 C.F.R. 904 (comp.
1938-1943) (Bulgaria); Exec. Order No. 8711, 3 C.F.R. 910 (comp. 1938-1943) (Hungary);
Exec. Order No. 8721, 3 C.F.R. 917 (comp. 1938-1943) (Yugoslavia); Exec. Order No.
8746, 3 C.F.R. 929 (comp. 1938-1943) (Greece); Exec. Order No. 8785, 3 C.F.R. 948
(comp. 1938-1943) (Albania, Andorra, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Finland, Germany,
Italy, Liechtenstein, Poland, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics); Exec. Order No. 8832, 3 C.F.R. 969 (comp. 1938-1943) (China,
Japan); Exec. Order No. 8998, 3 C.F.R. 1053 (comp. 1938-1943) (Hong Kong). Congress
again retroactively approved Roosevelt's actions, and in so doing, erased doubts about its
legitimacy. Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 838, 839-40 (1941) (amending 50
U.S.C. app. § 5(b)); see also Hearings,supra note 101, at 30.
In 1950, President Truman used section 5(b) to declare a national emergency with respect to the Korean War. Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (Comp. 1949-1953), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. note prec. § 1 (1982). This declared emergency lasted for twentysix years, until terminated during the Carter Administration by the National Emergencies
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, § 101(a), 90 Stat. 1255, 1255 (1976) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1982).
105. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 8.
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usage, into something quite different from that which was envisioned in 1917.
Section 5(b)'s effect is no longer to "emergency situations" in the sense
of existing imminent danger. The continuing retroactive approval, either
explicit or implicit, by Congress of broad executive interpretations of the
scope of powers which it confers has converted the section into a general
grant of legislative authority to the President permitting the executive
branch by order, rule, and regulation to make laws concerning almost any
subject matter which can conceivably be brought within the terms of section
5(b).106

Congress responded by enacting Public Law No. 95-223. Title !, section 101(a) of the law amended section 5(b) of the TWEA
to remove the provision which had granted the President the authority to control economic transactions in time of national emergency, but left intact the broad authorities available in time of
war. 107 Title II of the law, the IEEPA, conferred upon the President the power to exercise controls on international economic
transactions only if he declares a national emergency 10 and reports to Congress every six months. 10 9 The IEEPA also reserves
the right of Congress to terminate any declared emergency by
concurrent resolution. 1 0
The Court's holding in Regan v. Wald allows the President to
frustrate Congress's intent to contain executive authority within
delegated limits. The IEEPA was enacted because the TWEA had
been inappropriately used as a flexible instrument of foreign policy in nonemergency situations. The dubious factual justifications
for the Administration's amendment to Regulation 560 fits the
type of abuse that Congress was trying to remedy. It is incongruous with the legislative purpose of the IEEPA and the TWEA reform act to allow the executive to amend Regulation 560 without
first obtaining congressional approval under the IEEPA.
3. The Grandfather Clause. The Court in Wald achieved its
substantive result by claiming to discern the "clear statutory language" of the grandfather clause."' Contrary to the Court's opin106. Id. at 9.
107. See Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(a), 91 Stat. 1625, 1625
(1977).
108. 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
109. 50 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (1982).
110. 50 U.S.C. § 1706(b) (1982).
111. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3036 (1984).
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ion, the "clear statutory language" of the clause is ambiguous and
open to interpretation." 2
Arguably, the clause can be interpreted broadly to allow modifications to the CACRs and other trade embargoes in effect
against communist nations.1 13 Throughout the subcommittee
hearings and reports, participants referred to the savings clause
and to the "exercise of those authorities" in terms of existing
"uses.""1 4 These "uses" of authorities were defined in broad
terms during the redrafting process to mean regulatory programs
limiting trade with Cuba, Vietnam, China and other communist
nations.1 1 5 The legislation's principal sponsor, Representative
Bingham of New York, seemed to indicate that the authority to
modify regulations within these trade embargoes was unlimited:
As I understand it,. . . all we are doing in the way of restricting those
[5(b)] powers is to say that starting in October of next year, the President
would have to redeclare the emergency and rejustify, in fact, the continuation of the controls. Beyond that, there would be no limitation on the
authorities.11 6

A committee member then queried: "The President would have
to redeclare the emergencies. Each use would require its own
redeclaration of national emergency.

117

The bill's sponsor re-

sponded in the affirmative. Subsequent administrative practice,
112. The grandfather clause states:
[tihe authorities conferred upon the President by section 5(b) of the [Trading
With the Enemy Act] which were being exercised with respect to a country on
July 1, 1977, as a result of a national emergency declared by the President
before such date, may continue to be exercised with respect to such country,
except that, unless extended, the exercise of such authorities shall terminate at
the end of the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of the National Emergencies Act [i.e., Sept. 14, 1976]. The President may extend the
exercise of such authority for one-year periods upon a determination that the
exercise of such authorities with respect to such country for another year is in
the national interest of the United States.
50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note (1982).
113. See infra notes 123-25.
114. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 147 ("There is a clear need to grandfather or
deal in some special way with existing uses of Section 5(b) authorities .... ") (statement of
R. Roger Majak, Staff Director of the House Subcommittee on International Economic
Policy and Trade); id. at 189 ("it was the purpose of [the saving clause] to grandfather in
existing uses of 5(b)") (statement of Rep. Bingham).
115. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 212 (remarks of Rep. Findley and Staff Director
Majak).
116. Hearings, supra note 101, at 168.
117. Id.
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without congressional objection, would suggest that "uses" and
"exercise of those authorities" means the broad regulatory programs and not specific restrictions within those programs.11 8 However, this broad interpretation appears to be contradicted by specific inquiries of committee members into the extent of power
that would be reserved under the original draft of the clause. The
original draft not only preserved "authorities which were being
exercised with respect to a country on the date of enactment of
this Act," but also included a provision that "any other authority
conferred upon the President by [section 5(b)] may be exercised
to deal with the same set of circumstances." 119 It was explained in
committee, that under this second provision, "not only could the
President use those particular authorities that he is now using, but
any others which are conferred by Section 5(b). So, if the President was using asset controls towards a particular country, but was
not using . . . currency controls, he nonetheless could use, at

some later date, if he so desired, currency controls."'"2 The bill's
sponsor objected to this latter provision stating:
It seems to me that if the President has not up to now used some authority that he has under Section 5(b) in connection with those cases where
Section 5(b) has been applied, I don't know why it should be necessary to
give him authority to expand what has already been done. It really goes beyond grandfathering.' 2'

This "expansion provision" was later struck from the clause.
Therefore, it can be argued that Congress and witnesses equated
the terms "authorities" and "uses" with the specific prohibitions
and restrictions within the trade embargoes and not with the general trade embargoes themselves. The Wald Court failed to note
that Congress never defined unequivocally whether they were
grandfathering the prohibitions or simply the broad control pro118. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1985). Since 1977, the President has had to justify only
the need to extend the national emergency with respect to the general embargo of Cuba.
Separate and individual justification for each regulation or restriction within the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (1985), has not been required. See also supra
note 29.
119. Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations, Working Draft of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 2 (June 8, 1977) (setting forth section 101 of the proposed legislation),
quoted and reprinted in Brief for Appellants at 17 & app. A, Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794
(1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984).
120. Hearings, supra note 101, at 167.

121. Id.
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grams and the exercise of any section 5(b) power within those
"emergency" situations. It is unpersuasive for the Court to find
the statutory language clear when in fact conflicting statements
from the legislative history suggest otherwise.
The Court also misunderstood the intents and purposes behind the grandfathering. In an attempt to imbue the clause with
unlimited prospective qualities, it concluded that the clause provided the President with authority to modify existing licenses so
that he would be able to "respon[d] to heightened tensions" with
affected countries.122 Yet, the legislative history suggests a more
limited interpretation of the clause.
At the time Congress was considering the TWEA reform act,
it was confronted with the problem of four embargo programs
which did not fit the statutory criteria of the IEEPA: the CACRs,
Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 123 Transaction Control Regulations 124 and the Foreign Funds Control Regulations 2 5 all had
been implemented by virtue of President Truman's Korean War
national emergency declaration, now invalid under the reform
legislation. The four programs could have been subjected to the
1977 reform legislation, which would, in effect, have automatically terminated them. This was considered "inappropriate to legislation attempting to legislate for the future not judge the
past, ' 1 26 and inadvisable because the regulations were "deemed
important for the day-to-day functioning of the Government.' 27

Second, the legislators debated over whether the many trade embargoes and regulations within those programs should be considered individually on their merits and incorporated selectively into
the new legislation. Because certain current uses of the section
5(b) authorities were considered "controversial-particularly the
total trade embargoes of Cuba and Vietnam.

.

.

.The committee

decided that to revise current uses and to improve policies and
122. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3037 (1984).
123. 31 C.F.R. pt. 500 (1985) (prohibiting designated economic transactions with
North Korea, Cambodia, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam except by license granted by
the Treasury Department).
124. 31 C.F.R. pt. 505 (1985) (restricting trade in strategic commodities between the
United States and communist nations).
125. 31 C.F.R. pt. 520 (1985) (blocking the assets of certain Eastern European countries that confiscated property of U.S. citizens after the communists seized power).
126. HousE REPORT, supra note 101, at 11.
127. Id. at 6.
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procedures that would govern future uses, in a single bill would
be difficult and divisive."12 Third, by allowing the four trade embargoes to terminate upon the effective date of the new legislation, Congress would have placed the President in the position of
having to declare a new economic emergency pursuant to the
IEEPA with respect to each country affected by an embargo. Administration officials and expert witnesses warned that serious diplomatic problems might arise from such action.1 29 There was also
a concern among members of the subcommittee that if current
embargoes were implicated, the bill would bog down in partisan
disputes, delaying or threatening the viability of the legislation. 130
For this reason, subcommittee members decided to focus their efforts on improving procedures for future uses of emergency international economic powers, not on changing existing uses. 131 Accordingly, Congress decided that some grandfathering was
needed.
The Court seized upon the need for grandfathering as an indication that Congress intended to avoid the controversy that
would result if the President's authority to modify existing regula128. Id. at 10.
129. Witnesses during the hearings suggested that a complete repeal of the Trading
With the Enemy Act, one that would terminate the embargoes, would be unwise, both
politically and diplomatically. One suggested that forcing the President to publicly announce a new declaration of emergency, as required by the National Emergencies Act, see
50 U.S.C. § 1621(a) (1982), might be an "inappropriate interference in negotiations being
carried out by the Executive Branch" and "would be. . .very awkward ..if the [Cuban]
embargo were suddenly to end without any deal [with Cuba]." Hearings, supra note 101, at
19 (remarks of Professor Lowenfeld).
Assistant Treasury Secretary Bergsten repeated this theme, claiming that "a unilateral
termination of the embargoes," coupled with a requirement that the President publicly
reassert national emergencies, "would severely undermine the U.S. negotiating position
with [certain] countries, and our worldwide posture." Id. at 103.
Representative Bingham remarked that he "personally would not argue that we should
ask or expect the President to declare for the first time, an emergency with respect to
Cuba." Id. at 190.
130. The subcommittee sought only to reform the procedures and authorities for future cases-not to make changes in the Cuban embargo. Representative Bingham, the
bill's principal sponsor, admitted that "if we were to attempt to do otherwise, this bill
would become enormously controversial and would reach into substance rather than being
essentially a revision of procedures

..

.

.We will get this all fouled up

. .

.if we attempt

[to repeal the embargoes]." Hearings,supra note 101, at 168. See also id. at 199 (Rep. Bingham commenting on the likely success of the bill if the Cuban embargo would not be
affected).
131. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 101, at 11; see also Hearings, supra note 101, at
199.

1985]

REGAN v. WALD

623

tions was made subject to the TWEA reform. But as the dissent
noted, the Court misapprehended the aspects of the statute that
Congress feared would be divisive. The need to preserve the power
to modify the regulations was never a concern. Rather, Congressgrandfathered "those Section 5(b) authorities" because it would
have been controversial if it had instead attempted a substantive
examination of existing controls to determine if they were justified by the exigencies of a particular situation. The clause, therefore, actually represented a compromise between those who advocated total termination of the programs and those who
appreciated the ramifications of such unilateral action. In an abstract sense, any congressional concern, express or otherwise, to
preserve the power of amendment or modification, would have to
lie somewhere in between these two negotiating postures. The reserved presidential authority for future modifications appears to
reach beyond both the limits established by these postures and the
congressional intent of this compromise.
The Court's interpretation might have been correct if a congressional concern had existed to protect the presidential authority to modify licenses. In fact, the debate did not revolve around
the question of future modification. Rather, the issue in the subcommittee, beyond grandfathering, was whether the CACRs and
the other embargoes would be subject to the provisions of the National Emergencies Act (NEA), 13 2 with annual review and annual
statements by the President for the continuation of that emergency, or whether they should be allowed to continue indefinitely
without review.13 3 Proponents of unconditional grandfathering
were concerned mainly with garnering enough votes from conservative legislators who favored the embargoes of communist nations. 3 ' Opponents questioned the substance of the "national
emergency" with respect to many communist countries. Their
viewpoint ultimately prevailed and a partial grandfathering making the embargoes subject to the provisions of the NEA was incor132. See National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982). The Act mandated that Congress find a way to deal with the trade embargoes already declared under
section 5(b) and possible future uses of 5(b). 50 U.S.C. § 1651(b) (1982). Reform of section
5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982), and enactment of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982),
resulted.
133. See Hearings, supra note 101, at 198.
134. Id.
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porated into the grandfather clause.' 35
In sum, far from being concerned with "future tensions," the
subcommittee was not persuaded that the situation with Cuba con"stituted an emergency. It is, therefore, disingenuous for the Wald
Court to suggest "that Congress intended to give the President
greater flexibility to respond to 'heightened tensions' developments with Cuba than to events in other trouble spots in the
world such as the Middle East, Poland, or Afghanistan." 130 The
IEEPA was enacted to deal precisely with such developments.
"With respect to future developments in such places, the IEEPA
makes clear that the President cannot use his emergency powers
to respond to 'heightened tensions' unless the President has decided that a state of emergency exists, and has so declared. 1 37 To
reason that the grandfather clause reserves the executive authority to indefinitely promulgate regulations regarding Cuba, as the
Court would permit under its holding vitiates the revision of
emergency powers accomplished by the 1977 legislation.
4. Statutory Conflicts. The Court's ruling also conflicts with the
spirit of other legislation enacted in the 1970's restricting the executive's authority over foreign affairs. In particular, the Court's
holding is contrary to an express congressional limitation on the
executive's power to inhibit travel. In 1978 Congress amended
the Passport Act to remove the authority of the Secretary of State
to impose peacetime travel restrictions barring exceptional circumstances.188 The passport amendment represents a congressional determination that travel can be restricted only under conditions specified by Congress. 39 In the face of such a clear
135. Id. at 198-99.
136. See Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3047 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
137. Id.
138. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-426, § 124, 92 Stat. 963, 971 (1978) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 21 la (1982)). The 1978 amendment added the following provision.
Unless authorized by law, a passport may not be designated as restricted for
travel to or for use in any country other than a country with which the United
States is at war, where armed hostilities are in progress, or where there is imminent danger to the public health or the physical safety of United States
travellers.
22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982).
139. 22 U.S.C. § 21 la was amended to comply with the various freedom of travel
provisions agreed to at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, see, e.g., Final Act of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1310-11, 1314-15,
1320, 1322 (1975) (provisions relating to tourism, travel for personal or professional rea-
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congressional statement, the power the President claims under the
TWEA to restrict travel through currency controls is irreconcili1 40
able with the 1978 Passport Act and is presumptively ultra vires.
The Court contended that the amendment was irrelevant to the
question of the President's authority under the TWEA.
Yet in
ignoring the Passport Act amendment, the Court violates Congress' express intention of making "the freedom-to-travel principle. . . a matter of law and not dependent upon a particular Ad14
' 2
ministration's policy.
The Supreme Court has previously stated that contemporaneously enacted statutes may shed light on the proper interpretation
of a statute in question. 143 If the Court had followed its own suggestion it would have found additional reasons beyond the 1978
Passport Act for reading the clause restrictively.
The reform of the TWEA was only a part of a series of laws
aimed at imposing congressional limits upon the President's international emergency powers. In 1973 Congress passed the War
Powers Resolution restricting presidential power to employ
United States forces abroad.4 Later in 1976, Congress terminated all presidentially declared national emergencies and provided procedures for presidential declarations and continuations
of national emergencies until the reform of the TWEA. 45 The
Court's action ignores its doctrine followed recently in Dames &
Moore v. Regan" which recognized the relevance of "legislation
sons, travel for cultural and artistic purposes, and educational exchanges), and to encourage other couiltries to follow suit. The legislative history of the 1978 amendment
shows that Congress intended to prohibit the executive from regulating travel in the absence of war or armed hostilities. See S. REP. No. 842, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-44 (1978);
H.R. REP. No. 1535, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. ii, 45 (1978). Recognizing that the amendment
made resumption of Cuban travel restrictions through passport controls impossible, the
President turned to the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-39, 41-44 (1982),
and the currency controls available in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. pt.

515 (1985).
140. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952); id. at
589-609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 637-46 (Jackson, J., concurring). 141. Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026, 3034 n.16 (1984).
142. S. REP. No. 842, supra note 139, at 14.
143. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981).
144. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (restrictions on presidential authority to
deploy U.S. forces abroad) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982 & Supp.
1 1983)).
145. See supra notes 29 & 132.
146. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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closely related to the question of the President's authority in a
particular case. 14 7 The result of the Regan v. Wald decision is a
restoration of executive authority expressly limited by Congress
and a nullification of the 1978 Passport Act in terms of Cuba.
B.

The Court's ConstitutionalAnalysis

In Wald the Court ultimately rested its constitutional analysis
of Regulation 560 on the long judicial tradition of sustaining executive foreign policy decisions. 48 In reaching its result, the
Court engaged in only the most perfunctory treatment of the constitutional right to travel as first enunciated in Zemel v. Rusk.1 49
The hurried constitutional analysis in Wald betrays the Court's eagerness to subordinate civil liberties to the President's unilateral
foreign policy determinations. In its haste to defer to the executive branch, the Court made several errors.
The Supreme Court first held in Kent v. Dulles'50 that travel is
a part of liberty of which a citizen cannot be deprived without due
process of law. The doctrine was developed further in Zemel, a
decision upholding comprehensive travel restrictions that were
not directed solely at a person's political beliefs or did not impair
a person's first amendment rights. The Court in Zemel recognized
147. See id. at 678.
148. 104 S. Ct. at 3039 ("Matters relating 'to the conduct of foreign relations. . .are
so exclusively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune
from judicial inquiry or interference.' ") (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580,
589 (1952)); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319
(1936).
The Court's reluctance to pass on the constitutionality of an executive foreign policy
decision is founded on "political question" abstention doctrine. Although this doctrine has
been articulated in several different contexts, it rests on a belief by the Court that maintenance of the separation of powers in the federal government precludes judicial decision on
issues that are deemed particularly unsuitable for judicial review.
The modern and more narrow guidelines for the political question doctrine were laid
out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, the Court stated that there was a
"political question" when
[wie have [a] question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch coequal
with this Court. [Or] when we risk embarrassment of our government abroad
• * * if we take issue with [the] action. . . challenged. [Or when] the appellants,
in order to succeed in [their] action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are lacking.
Id. at 226.
149. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
150. 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
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travel as a liberty that could be inhibited provided it was accorded
due process protections. Under the Zemel standard, the criteria of
due process is in part a function of the necessity for the restriction. The justification of the regulation in Zemel was two-fold: the
restriction against travel to Cuba applied equally to all citizens and
was necessary because of the weightiest concerns of national
security.
The Court in Wald, however, mistakingly applied Zemel. It likened the "blanket" currency restriction in Wald to the passport
restriction in Zemel. First, the restrictions are factually dissimilar;
Zemel dealt with health and safety concerns of American travelers
in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, while Wald seeks to deny
Cuba hard currency. Second, the Zemel travel restriction withstood due process analysis because tensions with Cuba were of sufficient weight to demand universal travel restrictions applicable to
all Americans.15 The restriction in Wald, however, is not universal; it arbitrarily regulates tourist and business travel while permitting other types of travel. 52 Third, the restriction in Zemel was
permissible because the Court was able to find a congressional
grant of authority through a long-standing administrative practice
and congressional acquiesence to passport travel restrictions. Congress subsequently rejected passport restrictions in 1978 when it
amended the Passport Act to limit the executive's travel restriction powers only to cases of personal health or safety.1 3 Since the
urgency which served to legitimate the executive's action in Zemel
is totally absent in Wald, it is difficult to understand the Court's
extension of Zemel to Wald. If the Court had not disregarded the
dissimilarities between the two cases, it would have found Zemel
inapplicable, and quite possibly, Regulation 560, invalid.
The Court also failed to follow the basic rules of statutory
construction when constitutional issues are implicated. It is well
established that statutes are construed, whenever possible, to
avoid constitutional issues. 1 5 This is particularly the case when re151. See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 13.
152. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1985) and supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
153. See supra note 138 and text accompanying notes 138-40.
154. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 411 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted
than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass
on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such adjudication is unavoidable.") (quoting
Spector Motor Serv., Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944)).
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strictions on travel are involved. 5 5 Under this approach, the
Court could have avoided the right to travel issue by interpreting
the grandfather clause narrowly. Instead, the Court rushed to find
the amendment of Regulation 560 valid under the guise of the
judicial deference doctrine.
Further, the Court ignored the issue of whether the goal of
denying Cuba hard currency could have been achieved through
less drastic means. In determining the constitutionality of travel
restrictions, the Court should have considered the possibility of
finding alternative means of safeguarding our national security. 150
The trade restrictions with Cuba leave open sources from which
Cuba can obtain hard currency that are more important than the
source blocked by Regulation 560.57 Instead, the Court in Wald
immediately deferred to the President's judgment that Cuba was
pursuing "objectives inimical to United States foreign policy interests" and found this "an adequate basis under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to sustain the President's decision
to . . . restrict travel. 15 8
The Court's failure even to consider the above requirements
of basic constitutional analysis represents an extreme willingness
to surrender its role in ensuring that the exercise of executive
power stays within the limits set by Congress. The majority
claimed its decision was based on the Court's "classical deference
to the political branches in matters of foreign policy."1 50 But in
reality, the Court actively intervened to reallocate power to the
President. In previous cases, the Court deferred to the executive's
unilateral authority over foreign affairs by reaching first the question of whether the power had been granted either expressly 6 0 or

through congressional acquiesence to a long-standing executive
practice.1 61 In Wald however, a grant of authority from Congress
155. In Kent v. Dulles, the Court stated that "we will construe narrowly all delegated
powers that curtail [the right to travel]." 357 U.S. at 129.
156. Cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-13 (1964) (in determining
the constitutionality of travel restrictions, the Court should consider whether there are
'less drastic' means of. . . safeguarding our national security").
157. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
158. 104 S. Ct. at 3039.
159. Id.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wkight Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20
(1936) (executive discretion on enforcement of statute prohibiting sale of war munitions to
foreign nations).
161. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678-79 (1981) (practice of for-
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is unnecessary; it conceives the executive power to act in foreign
affairs to be a matter largely immune from judicial inquiry.
Rather than follow the commandment of judicial deference to
both political branches, the Court intervened to weigh the factual
justification for the restriction in order to balance it against the
limitation upon liberty.1

2

In this way, the Court forced itself to

render an opinion based partly upon its independent foreign policy analysis-a function forbidden by the law upon which the
Court relies. Under the Court's skewed reasoning, the restriction
of travel is not dependent on any express or implied grant of
power, but rather, on a matter which is best left to the sole determination of the President and the Court.
CONCLUSION

The Court's choice of a formalistic approach over a more indepth analysis of Regulation 560 betrayed its desire to neglect
convincing statutory and constitutional arguments that, if considered, would have invalidated the Reagan Administration's prohibition of tourist and business travel to Cuba. Contrary to the
Court's opinion, the grandfather clause is vague on the question
of whether it permits modifications or amendments in the CACRs.
eign claims settlement); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981) (practice of passport
revocation on national security grounds); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1965) (practice
of passport restrictions in both war and peace).
The Court's holding in Zemel, however, should be qualified by noting that the 1978
amendment to the 1926 passport law sharply limited executive authority to withhold a
passport. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1976) with 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1982).
162. Although it indicated that it would not, the Supreme Court rendered its own
foreign policy analysis at the end of its decision in Regan v. Wald, independently weighing
the evidence in favor of Regulation 560.
[E]vidence presented to the [lower courts shows] that relations between Cuba
and the United States have not been "normal" for the past quarter of a century, and that those relations have deteriorated further in recent years due to
increased Cuban efforts to destabilize governments throughout the Western
Hemisphere. . .. Cuba, [with the support] of the Soviet Union, has provided
widespread support for armed violence and terrorism .

. .

. Cuba also main-

tains close to 40,000 troops in various countries in Africa and the Middle East
in support of objectives inimical to United States foreign policy interests ...
Given the traditional deference to executive judgment "[i]n this vast external
realm," we think that there is an adequate basis under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to sustain the President's decision to curtail the flow of
hard currency to Cuba-currency that could then be used in support of Cuban
adventurism-by restricting travel.
104 S. Ct. at 3039 (citations omitted & emphasis added).
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An examination of Congress' intent behind the grandfathering
and the TWEA reform act, as well as Regulation 560's conflict
with the 1978 Passport Act, compels a narrow reading of the
grandfather clause. The Court also displayed its willingness to
subordinate the exercise of the constitutional right to travel
abroad-a right that should not be abridged by a particular administration's policy-to a foreign policy determination which
conformed to the President's and their own political predilictions.
In effect, the Court's holding renders meaningless a decade of
congressional action which had sought to gain a greater voice in
our foreign affairs in terms of Cuba. As a consequence, the power
to regulate travel to Cuba has been re-allocated to the President
by the Court at the expense of Congress and the people.
BRIAN

G.

HART

INTENTIONAL
BLANK

